False prophet, or genuine savior? Assessing the effects of economic openness on sustainable development, 1980-1999 by de Soysa, Indra & Neumayer, Eric
  
Indra de Soysa and Eric Neumayer 
False prophet, or genuine savior? Assessing 
the effects of economic openness on 
sustainable development, 1980-1999 
 




de Soysa, Indra and Neumayer, Eric (2005) False prophet, or genuine savior? Assessing the 
effects of economic openness on sustainable development, 1980-1999. International 
organization, 59 (3). pp. 731-772. ISSN 0020-8183  
 
DOI: 10.1017/S0020818305050253   
 
© 2005 Cambridge University Press 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/14916/  
Available in LSE Research Online: August 2012 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
False Prophet, or Genuine Savior?
Assessing the Effects of Economic
Openness on Sustainable
Development, 1980–99
Indra de Soysa and Eric Neumayer
Abstract While many herald globalization—the increasing interconnectedness
of national economies—to be associated with rising standards of living across the
globe, others fear its effects on sustainability+ Antiglobalization forces and environ-
mentalists view these developments as a threat to the welfare of future generations
because of profligate and excessive current consumption+ This study is the first to
estimate the effects of dependence on trade, foreign direct investment ~FDI!, and an
index of economic freedom on the World Bank’s measure of sustainability ~the gen-
uine savings rate!, which measures the rate at which investment in the total stock of
manufactured, human, and natural capital exceeds its depreciation+ Contrary to pessi-
mists’ fears, our indicators of economic openness show positive effects on sustain-
ability, results that are robust to sample size, testing procedure, and several alternative
specifications+ The results support those who suggest that distorted economies tend
to be both inefficient and damaging to future generations+ If increasing trade, FDI,
and economic freedom are hallmarks of globalization, then worries about its effects
on future well-being are misplaced+
Although many view growing economic interdependence as good for global pros-
perity, others fear its effects on sustainability+1 The pessimists expect the fierce
competition resulting from market globalization and enhanced economic freedom
to push countries into unsustainable patterns of resource depletion and economic
production, maximizing current profits at the expense of future welfare+2 Opti-
mists, including most economists, argue instead that market globalization and eco-
nomic freedom lead to a more efficient allocation of resources by enhancing the
Equal authorship+ We are grateful to Erich Weede, Rick Auty, Simon Dietz, Paul Hensel, Jonathan
Moses, Ragnar Torvik, Jostein Vik, Paivi Lujala, two reviewers, and the editor for comments and sug-
gestions+ The anonymous reviewers were extraordinarily constructive+Any remaining errors are entirely
our fault+ The data are available at ^http:00www+svt+ntnu+no0iss0Indra+de+Soysa0default+htm&+
1+ See Mikesell 1992; Neumayer 2003; Pearce and Warford 1993; and World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development 1987+
2+ See MacNeill, Winsemius, and Yakushiji 1991; and Meadows, Meadows, and Randers 1993+
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role of relative prices and by punishing inefficient policymaking, which should
promote both current and future welfare+3
This study will examine the effects of openness to trade and foreign direct invest-
ment ~FDI! on an index of economic freedom on national genuine savings ~GS!
rates ~adjusted net savings!, a broad indicator of ~weak! sustainability with wide
coverage spanning a period of twenty years+4 This index is a measure of the rate at
which investment in manufactured, human, and natural capital exceeds its depre-
ciation+5 This measure is based on a widely held precept that sustainable develop-
ment is the ability to maintain ~increase! the aggregate value of manufactured,
human, and natural capital, with natural capital being defined as anything in nature
providing value to human beings+6 Atkinson and Hamilton conclude a recent paper
by suggesting that “it would be interesting in future work to examine the determi-
nants of the genuine savings rate+”7 This is the first study to test the effects of
market globalization and economic freedom on GS+ We find positive and statisti-
cally significant effects that are robust toward a whole battery of sensitivity tests
by way of different estimation techniques, inclusion of different control variables,
and various subsamples of the data+
Today, the World Bank and other organizations devoted to development distin-
guish between “good” and “bad” growth+8 The World Bank’s GS rate is a result of
this new thinking+ Because the assumption of this approach is that substitutability
between various forms of capital is high, this measure is admittedly one that cap-
tures “weak sustainability+”9 In contrast, strong sustainability is the view that all
natural capital should be kept intact and that substitutability between forms of
capital is not possible+ Strong sustainability arguments in the globalization debate,
however, are less prevalent given the preoccupation of both the right and left with
the creation of jobs, economic growth, and concerns over relative economic well-
being+ In fact, strong environmentalism, largely prevalent in developed countries,
views sustainable development to be a contradiction in terms+ One popular mea-
sure of strong sustainability is the concept of ecological footprints ~EF!+ This con-
cept relates to the amount of environmental resources, defined as the available
area of land ~habitat!, required for sustaining the current levels of consumption as
well as for absorbing waste and pollution resulting from consumption+10 This con-
cept gives little room for the substitution of environmental resources with manu-
factured capital, nor can it adequately account for trade as a substitute for scarcity+
3+ See World Bank 1992; Pearce and Warford 1993; Neumayer 2002a; and Bhagwati 2004+
4+ See Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; Hamilton 2001; and World Bank 1997+ The term “genuine
savings” was coined by Kirk Hamilton and subsequently appears as “net adjusted savings” in the World
Development Indicators+
5+ World Bank 2002+
6+ See Atkinson et al+ 1997; Goodwin 2003; Hamilton and Clemens 1999; and Mikesell 1992+
7+ Atkinson and Hamilton 2003, 1804+
8+ Thomas et al+ 2000+
9+ See Costanza and Jørgensen 2002; Neumayer 2004; and Pearce and Atkinson 1993+
10+ Wackernagel et al+ 1999+
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For example, Singaporeans have more ~and better! water resources at their dis-
posal than large resource wealthy states such as Nigeria, the Democratic Republic
of Congo, or Angola because human and manufactured capital compensate for nat-
ural resource scarcity+ In this article, we mainly focus on how increasing global-
ization determines a state’s chances for achieving weak sustainability+ We believe
that any conception of sustainability must leave at least some room for substitut-
ability ~we do not think that universities should not be built if trees have to be
destroyed!+ Also, weak sustainability is a necessary condition for achieving strong
sustainability+ In addition, we also briefly address the issue of strong sustainability+
Estimating the effect of globalization and economic freedom on weak sustain-
ability is not just an academic question+ Policymakers at many levels seek to har-
monize urgent societal requirements, such as growth of income, employment, and
general well-being, while ensuring intra- and intergenerational equity+ Many rec-
ognize that current economic accounting does not fully reflect the trade-offs among
various forms of capital+11 For example, economic rents derived from resource
extraction and tree cutting do not fully represent income, in that part of the rents
represent depreciation of the natural capital stock+ Similarly, economic develop-
ment that comes at the expense of environmental harm may reduce future well-
being+ The green accounting program within economics seeks to value investment
and depreciation of all forms of capital so that trade-offs among various forms of
capital can be better accounted for+ The maintenance of all forms of capital that
are valuable for production and consumption is regarded as a desirable goal, a
notion widely accepted by the pioneers in the profession who seek to measure
sustainability so as to translate knowledge into policy+12 This article is organized
as follows: first, we examine arguments about globalization and economic sustain-
ability; next we examine the relevance of GS as an important empirical indicator
measuring the concept of sustainability; then we present our results; and finally
we conclude+
Economic Openness and Sustainability
This study approaches the question of globalization and sustainability from a
national perspective by measuring the degree to which states are exposed to, or
are connected with, the global economic system+ It is standard practice to measure
globalization as “interconnectedness” through trade and FDI penetration+13 Accord-
ing to Mikesell, “@A# comprehensive treatise on sustainable development should
integrate the macroeconomics of conventional development with the special con-
11+ See Dasgupta 2001; and Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2003+
12+ Pearce and Warford 1993+
13+ See Birdsall and Lawrence 1999; and Nye and Donahue 2000+
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cern of natural resource sustainability and environmental protection+”14 Our study
attempts to address the concerns of conventional development economists, who
see globalization as a source of good because it promotes growth and develop-
ment, and environmental economists, who argue that globalization may promote
profligate patterns of production and consumption that comes at the expense of
environmental harm and resource depletion+
Supporters of globalization argue that greater interdependence between rich and
poor states and the liberalization of markets from the clutches of profligate gov-
ernments will enhance wealth, increase efficiency, and destroy the barriers against
international environmental cooperation+15 Trade liberalization is seen as promot-
ing economic growth,16 which in turn is regarded as beneficial to sustainability, at
least in the long run+17 Similarly, FDI is thought to supply poor countries with
markets, transfer technology and capital, and above all, provide income growth,
employment, and poverty reduction+18 The theoretical argument on the beneficial
effect of income growth on sustainability is that poverty supposedly pollutes and
that demand for environmental quality is a normal, if not luxury, good+ Poor peo-
ple degrade the environment by using slash-and-burn agriculture, employing out-
moded and inefficient production systems, remaining poor by being dependent on
natural resource exports, burning biomass that drives the greenhouse effect, and
being highly dependent on burning fossil fuels for energy, particularly coal+ Demand
for and the economy’s capacity to supply strict environmental regulation increases
with rising income+19 Empirically, economists have tried to demonstrate the link
via the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve ~EKC!+Accordingly, environmen-
tal quality is expected to worsen with increasing income, but only initially, and
then improves after a certain threshold, computed by some to be around $5,000 to
$8,000 per capita, depending on which pollutant one looks at+20
In addition to the income effect, trade and FDI allow the efficient allocation of
resources across the world, where a country specializes in those activities it has an
advantage in so that countries with an abundance of one resource can trade with
those that are abundant in another, thereby achieving maximum output for a given
input—in other words, movement toward sustainability because waste is mini-
14+ Mikesell 1992, 141+
15+ Some scholars estimate the impact of globalization on government spending to assess whether
governments “race to the bottom+” Much evidence seems to suggest that governments adapt to the
increasing competition by compensating society with public goods, such as education+ See Adserà and
Boix 2002; Garrett 1998; and Rodrik 1996+
16+ See Krueger 1998; Greenaway, Morgan, and Wright 1998; Frankel and Romer 1999; and Wac-
ziarg and Welch 2003+
17+ See Bhagwati 2004; and Frankel 2003+
18+ See Borensztein, de Gregorio, and Lee 1998; Cooper 2001; de Mello 1999; de Soysa and Oneal
1999; and Klein, Aaron, and Hadjimichael 2001+
19+ Copeland and Taylor 2003+
20+ Grossman and Krueger 1995+
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mized+21 Openness to trade is also associated with getting prices right and ending
distortions, which enhances sustainability+ Governments are likely to subsidize eco-
nomic activity for political reasons, thereby increasing waste, a policy that is highly
costly and becomes increasingly untenable the more exposed a country is to global
markets+22 Economic openness is therefore often taken as a proxy for good eco-
nomic policies+ Open trading regimes are also more amenable to spreading newer,
better technologies faster than more closed regimes+23 Because environmentally
friendly production is likely to be lucrative as people value the environment more,
such production technologies will be adopted faster where the market determines
the prices+ The adoption of such technologies across integrated space may lead to
the “leveling up” when laggards are forced by the market to standardize+24 Liber-
als therefore conclude that autarkic policies and government-dominated markets
cause high environmental damage and low output+ The experience of state plan-
ning exemplified by the former Soviet Union demonstrates that unsustainable man-
agement of resources, inefficient economic production, and inadequate channels
for civil society to affect policies results in bad outcomes for people and the planet+25
Globalization critics therefore “fight the wrong enemy+”26
Finally, while both camps recognize that protecting the global commons requires
real international cooperation, with some even calling for a World Environment
Organization to rival the World Trade Organization, free traders view the inter-
dependence among countries as a potent driver of environmental cooperation+27
Countries more open to trade are more likely to have signed and ratified important
multilateral environmental agreements+28 In this light, states that trade more with
each other potentially have common cause and incentive to cooperate, an age old
precept articulated most thoroughly by such philosophers as Immanuel Kant,Mon-
tesquieu, and the Manchester school+29
Critics counter these arguments by stating that globalization exploits poor coun-
tries and constrains the degree to which they are able to achieve sustainability+
Some highly popularized, anecdotal and journalistic arguments suggest that global-
21+ Brack 1995+
22+ See Birdsall and Wheeler 1993; and Yu 1994+
23+ Perkins and Neumayer 2004+
24+ The German decision to make catalytic converters mandatory in new cars, for example, was
largely because car manufacturers were already tooled to produce cars for the U+S+ market, which had
required catalytic converters almost a decade previously+ This effect is called the trading-up of envi-
ronmental standards+ See Vogel 1995+
25+ The Aral sea catastrophe makes one wonder whether any planner in the USSR asked whether
the cotton was worth the sea+ Possibly, fish and tourism, among other activities, might have been more
economical, not to mention beneficial in other respects too, for the people of the area+ Such examples
of environmental waste are quite numerous across the globe+ See Ascher 1999+
26+ Graham 2000+
27+ Haas, Keohane, and Levy 1993+
28+ Neumayer 2002a+
29+ Russett and Oneal 2001+
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ization leads to “global pillage+”30 Antiglobalization activists successfully scuttled
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment ~MAI! on the basis that it would allow
corporations to destroy the global commons+ Giant corporations are accused of
“stealing” the patrimony of the poor and the unborn for conspicuous consumption
by the rich and globalization leads to cost-cutting, not efficient allocation of
resources, and to downward pressure on environmental and social standards:31
The pursuit of high and rising consumption in the North and of development
in the South have together led to the increasing exploitation of natural resources
in unsustainable ways, often by TNC investment in resource-extractive indus-
tries in developing countries+ + + + Policies focusing on liberalization, deregu-
lation and export orientation respond to the logic of short-term profit
maximization and international competition that intensifies the need for cost-
cutting+ The result is the rapacious exploitation and wasteful use of natural
resources+32
Some critics of globalization also assert that increasing trade and specialization
may work against efficiency viewed in terms of the dependent nature of most poor
countries on the export of primary commodities+ Increased trade may snare the
poor countries in a “specialization trap” that locks them into servicing a world
market growing ever more hungry for resources+33 Others have argued that polit-
ical structures within countries favor capital at the expense of resource protection,
which leads to the subsidization of foreign investors at the expense of sustain-
ability+34 More generally, critics of globalization argue that trade agreements bind
countries to standardized laws and regulations that will reduce the ability for gov-
ernments and societies to make autonomous decisions by addressing local prob-
lems with local solutions+Moreover, critics argue that the systemic interdependence
takes away agency from governments of less developed countries ~LDCs!+ Greater
integration of developing countries in market relations diminishes their capacity
to act independently, because those countries become locked in dependent rela-
tions with the rich+ Countries more dependent on trade and investment are expected
not to be able to follow sustainable paths of development, because it would be
against the interests of international capital+35
Many pessimists argue that increasing income alone will not automatically take
care of environmental problems, because the level of income of many poor coun-
tries is so low that increased consumption in rich areas will place too great a bur-
den on an already overloaded planet, long before the poor get rich+36 In other words,
30+ Brecher and Costello 1994+
31+ See Hardt and Negri 2000; Korten 2001; Martin and Schumann 1997; and Zammit 2003+
32+ Zammit 2003, 137+
33+ Røpke 1994+
34+ López 2003+
35+ See Grimes and Kentor 2003; Roberts and Grimes 1997; and York, Rosa, and Dietz 2003+
36+ See Daily and Ehrlich 1996; and Daly 1993+
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increased economic activity across the globe can magnify the effects of human
activity on the ecosystem, leading to collapse+37 Pessimists also contest the notion
that poverty pollutes more than wealth on grounds that the rich consume and waste
more+ In other words, the luxurious “greed” of the rich cannot be compared with
the survival “needs” of the poor+ These analysts suggest that increased trade will
accentuate the profligacy of the already rich+ The rich will expand their consump-
tion possibilities at the expense of the poor by displacing the environmental costs
on them+38 This proposition relates to what many term the “pollution haven hypoth-
esis,” whereby polluting industries move from more stringent regulatory environ-
ments to lax ones+
The debate between defenders and critics of globalization mirrors older theoret-
ical splits in the social sciences, which pitted dependency0world systems theorists
against liberals and modernization theorists concerning the fundamental nature of
whether or not closer contact between rich and poor results in exploitative out-
comes such as poverty, the export of pollution, and environmental degradation+39
Dependency theorists challenge the liberal view by arguing that international inter-
dependence is neocolonialism, a system of exploitation, which leads to distorted
LDC economies, lowered levels of democracy, and the breakdown of social rela-
tions+40 They suggest that openness to the world economy leads to the “decapital-
ization” of poor countries, because of the intensification of inappropriate
consumption, lowered domestic savings, and capital repatriation by foreign com-
panies+41 These theorists also argue that free trade results in uneven development
and a divided planet within which cooperation required for environmental protec-
tion may not be forthcoming+42 Their exhortations are generally to find alternative
paths to free-market capitalism+43 World-systems theory similarly views closer con-
tact between rich and poor as a barrier against endogenously determined paths of
progress+44
We contend that the longer-term effects of market globalization and economic
openness on sustainability can be judged by examining the effects of trade depen-
dence, dependence on FDI, and the level of economic freedom on patterns of sav-
ings of physical, human, and natural capital over time+45 This study asks to what
extent globalization promotes or hinders the achievement of weak sustainability+
If globalization represents an extractive, exploitative, top-down project, as the crit-
37+ Mabey and McNally 1998+
38+ Fernando 2003+
39+ For a review of long-standing theoretical debates and empirical evidence in political science
and sociology concerning the effects of MNCs on development, see de Soysa 2003+
40+ Amin 1990+
41+ Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985+
42+ For an excellent treatment of the differing perspectives, see Gilpin 2000+
43+ Fernando 2003+
44+ See Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Galtung 1971; and Hoogvelt
2001+
45+ Mikesell 1992+
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ics claim, then its effect on the accumulation of physical, human, and natural cap-
ital stocks over time should provide some indication of the expected harm+
Measuring Weak Sustainability
There are several operational definitions of sustainable development and methods
for calculating measures and indexes of sustainability+46 This study’s definition is
close to the sprit of the original, which is “development that meets the needs of
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs+”47 In other words, the steady depletion, or degradation of physical,
natural, or human capital without offsetting gains may be deemed unsustainable+
As some claim quite simply, savings of all forms of capital is the essence of
sustainability+48
Until quite recently, economists viewed the growth of gross domestic product
~GDP! as a measure of development+ GDP and the investment required for the
growth of output were thought of as involving merely manufactured and, perhaps,
human capital+ The degradation of natural capital in the process of economic activ-
ity was unaccounted in GDP statistics+ Green accounting processes began as an
important corrective for making GDP reflect the degradation of the natural envi-
ronment as a consequence of economic production+ As a result, the World Bank
embarked on estimating the “Wealth of Nations” to include manufactured, human,
and natural capital of countries as a first step toward monitoring the progress of
nations in terms of sustainability+49 The changes in the redefined estimates of wealth,
therefore, indicate the sustainability0unsustainability of a development trajectory
of any given country over time+ Importantly, however, these data also show that
the most important component of most nations’ capital stocks is human capital
~unfortunately, social capital is left out of the calculations because of the complex
issues surrounding its measurability!+
Our calculations based on these data reveal that the poorest countries have much
natural capital, but a relative lack of human capital+50 These data show that the
poorest countries have roughly five times more natural capital in total wealth com-
46+ Neumayer 2004+
47+ World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 89+
48+ Atkinson et al+ 1997+
49+ World Bank 1997+
50+ These data are constructed for about 100 countries for the year 1994 and represent the first
disaggregated measure of the actual wealth of nations+ The data are values for total natural capital
composed of cropland, land, pasture, timber, nontimber assets, protected areas, and all subsoil resources
~minerals!+ Human capital is computed as the value of labor based on education and health, and man-
ufactured capital consists of man-made objects such as buildings, roads, ports etc+ The construction of
the data is explained in several studies ~Hamilton and Clemens 1999; and Kunte et al+ 1998! and on
the World Bank’s department of environment Web site: ^http:00 lnweb18+worldbank+org0ESSD0
envext+nsf041ByDocName0Environment&+ Accessed 10 March 2005+
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pared with what the richest countries possess+51 As countries grow rich, their depen-
dence on natural wealth becomes minimal+ Indeed, the smallest wealth gap between
rich and poor countries in per capita terms is natural wealth+ The share of the
poorest countries’ per capita natural wealth in the richest countries’ total is roughly
65 percent, even though they only have 2 percent of the per capita income+ Thus
what the poor lack relative to the rich is not natural capital ~in per capita terms!,
but human and manufactured capital+
The importance of GS stems from its ability to indicate whether changes in the
total capital stock are beneficial or detrimental to future well-being+ As Dasgupta
has written,
Genuine investment is the social worth of net changes in an economy’s cap-
ital assets+ It is a comprehensive notion, including as it does the social worth
of net changes in manufactured and human capital, public knowledge, and
natural capital+ Thus, ensuring that social well-being is sustainable involves
taking care that the economy’s assets are managed well+52
The GS rate, or genuine investment rate as Dasgupta prefers to call it, is one effort
to estimate the sustainability path of nations based on how “well” they manage
their total capital stock+ How “well” then is highly dependent on the environmen-
tal costs based on damage to atmosphere—by carbon dioxide ~CO2!—and depre-
ciation of the natural resource stock ~forest, mineral, and energy stocks!+ While
resource-wealthy countries, such as oil producers, would naturally have higher
depletion, policies governing the decisions to spend on education and other invest-
ments in capital may more than offset the given depletion+ Such countries, however,
rarely make these forms of investment, which means that their future well-being
is jeopardized by an unsustainable path of resource extraction+53
While some argue about the exact method of calculating resource depletion and
some problematic assumptions surrounding the concept and its measurement,54
this study accepts the adequacy of the World Bank’s method for current purposes+
Naturally, scholars can further test the conflicting theories against better data as
they become available+ The multidimensionality of the measure of sustainability
that the GS rate presents, however, makes it an attractive choice for addressing
the larger issue of how globalization may influence well-being of nations over
time+ An additional advantage of this measure of sustainability is that it is widely
available in time-series format, is consistent with most orthodox views that see
economic activity requiring trade-offs, and is a measure policymakers readily under-
stand and would be able to respond to meaningfully+55
51+ The poorest countries are the World Bank’s 2002 list of “low income” countries and the richest
are the “high income” category+
52+ Dasgupta 2001, 87+
53+ See Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; and Hamilton 2001+
54+ Neumayer 2000+
55+ Atkinson and Hamilton 2003+
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The basic equation for calculating the GS rate is:
GS  ~investment in manufactured capital net foreign borrowing
 net official transfers depreciation of manufactured capital
 current education expenditures
 net depreciation of natural capital and
cost of atmospheric pollution! 0 gross national income ~GNI!
Note that investment in manufactured capital minus foreign borrowing plus net
official transfers minus depreciation of manufactured capital is equal to net national
savings+ While the traditional national accounting treats government spending on
education as consumption, the adjusted savings treats it as investment+ This is
regarded as a first approximation to the full value of human capital investment,
which is difficult to measure precisely+ Depreciation of natural capital covers non-
renewable resource extraction, such as fossil fuels and minerals, as well as for-
estry+ Cost of atmospheric pollution is approximated by the damage caused by
carbon dioxide emissions+ Detailed definitions of each item are provided in Appen-
dix 1+ Investment in manufactured capital “anchors” the GS rate as it forms the
starting point from which items are added and subtracted+Across countries, resource
depletion and investment in human capital represent the major correction compo-
nents to net national savings, with the cost of atmospheric pollution playing a
smaller role+With a mean value of 2+88 percent of gross national income, resource
depletion is not quite as important on average as educational expenditures at 3+94
percent+ Still, it is important given that the mean value of net national savings is
8+87 percent+Also, its standard deviation is quite high ~4+85!, and for some resource-
intensive countries, the resource depletion component can actually be almost as big
as, or in many cases even bigger, than net national savings+ Appendix 2 lists each
country’s GS rates and its change, both averaged over the entire period of study+
Statistical Methods and Data
This study employs a pooled, time-series, cross-section ~TSCS! data set+ The data
are for roughly 135 countries, spanning twenty years+56 The data set is unbalanced
and contains over 2,000 data points ~an average of about fifteen country-years!+
There are no clear models to guide the determinants of GS+ We control for the
following factors because of their connection to the main globalization variables
and direct effects on the dependent variable+We account for important factors pre-
dicting the gross savings rate, so as to control as fully as possible, but parsimoni-
56+ They are taken from World Bank 2002+ The data for Angola and Sudan only are from World
Bank 2003a because their values seem to be reported with errors in World Bank 2002+
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ously, for determinants of manufactured capital savings that may relate to GS
directly and to our globalization variables+57 Note that fiscal policy variables such
as government expenditures, tax revenues, and others cannot be included in the
estimations because income minus private and government consumption expendi-
tures is equal to investment, and they thus form part of GS+58 Their inclusion would
therefore effectively construct a partial identity between the left-hand side and the
right-hand side of the equation+ The same argument applies to measures of public
debt since net foreign borrowing forms part of GS+
Our measure of dependence on trade is total trade to GDP @~imports exports!0
GDP# +59 FDI dependence is calculated as the ratio of stock to GDP, obtained from
the United Nations, which is the most comprehensive data on the activities of multi-
national corporations ~MNCs! in poor countries+60 The stock of FDI is accumu-
lated investment over time, which captures the structural power of MNCs over a
host economy to a greater degree than do FDI flows alone+61 Trade and FDI are
logged to reduce skewness+
The hypothesis of the supporters of globalization is that trade and investment
openness lead to “good” economic, market-oriented policies+ Often, such open-
ness is used as an indirect proxy for such policies+ In addition, we also want to
test the impact of an admittedly subjective, but direct measure of good economic
policies, namely the Fraser Institute’s index of economic freedom+62 It is made up
of approximately thirty-five components of objective indicators capturing the extent
of economic freedom within countries+ The index measures freedom of economic
activity according to the following criteria in quintiles since 1980:63
1+ Size of government based on spending and the level of state ownership of
enterprises+
2+ Strength of legal system and sanctity of private property rights+
3+ Access to sound money+
4+ Freedom to exchange with foreigners+
5+ The extent of regulation of economic activity+
57+ We have largely relied on the World Bank’s research program on savings across the world to
pick several variables found to be associated with public and private savings rates+ See Loayza et al+
1998; and Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén 2000+ The basic model employs per capita income, its
growth rate, and urbanization—variables that have data points for at least 135 countries+ For robust-
ness, we also test broad money supply ~M20GDP!, and the age dependency ratio+ Using these vari-
ables lowers the sample of countries considerably+ The World Bank’s research on savings can be accessed
at ^http:00www+worldbank+org0research0projects0savings0savinwld+htm&+ Accessed 10 March 2005+
58+ Note that some forms of government induced inefficiencies will be captured by our measure of
economic freedom, albeit imperfectly+
59+ All data are taken from World Bank 2002 unless noted otherwise+
60+ United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2003+
61+ See Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985; de Soysa and Oneal 1999; and Grimes and Kentor 2003+
62+ Gwartney and Lawson 2003+
63+ See ^www+freetheworld+com& for details+
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The missing years for this variable are interpolated+ Because the score on eco-
nomic freedom changes slowly between the five-year periods measured, the inter-
polated values should not be problematic+ Strictly speaking, because economic
freedom has government size as one of its components, to some extent it also
suffers from the problem that its inclusion effectively constructs a partial identity
between the left-hand side and right-hind side of the estimation ~see above!+ For-
tunately, it is only one out of many components, which should mitigate the problem+
Although openness to trade and FDI figure quite prominently in assessing eco-
nomic freedom, they are but a small part of the overall measure+ The bivariate
correlations between economic freedom and trade and FDI, nonetheless, are r 
0+36 and r  0+33, respectively+ Clearly, the indicator of economic freedom cap-
tures aspects of open and market-oriented economic policies beyond what trade
and FDI alone are able to capture+ Using the economic freedom measure as an
added factor in the globalization process has additional value in that much argu-
mentation about globalization’s effects on sustainability reflects fears about grow-
ing economic freedom at the expense of government’s ability to regulate the market
for the sake of intergenerational equity+
The baseline model controls for level of per capita income because richer coun-
tries have higher savings rates and supposedly exhibit better environmental stan-
dards on several dimensions+64 GNI per capita in purchasing power parity is logged
to account for its skewed distribution+ We also include a squared term to allow for
a diminishing effect of per capita income on sustainability+ In addition to income,
we follow others and account for the structure of production by including the per-
centage of GDP devoted to agriculture+65 We control for economic growth, because
it is often thought that higher rates of growth require more intensive use of envi-
ronmental resources+ On the other hand, higher growth may enable increases in
other forms of capital, such as manufactured and human capital that reduces the
direct dependence of people on natural resources+66
Savings rates might be negatively affected if a country undergoes a financial
currency crisis+ To control for this possibility we include a dummy variable+ This
is set to 1 if, following Frankel and Rose, the local currency loses at least 25
percent of its value and the change in the exchange rate exceeds the previous year’s
change by at least 10 percent+67 The latter accounts for periods of high inflation+
The change in the exchange rate is defined as the change in the natural logarithm
of the nominal bilateral dollar exchange rate+
The models include the degree to which countries are dependent on natural
resource exports because resource depletion will be higher among these countries+
As the early studies of the GS data indicate, energy-rich states in particular tend
64+ See Bhagwati 1999; Frankel 2003; Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven 2000; Ogaki, Ostry,
and Reinhart 1995; and Shafik 1994+
65+ Grimes and Kentor 2003+
66+ See Coxhead and Jayasuriya 2003; and Loayza et al+ 1998+
67+ Frankel and Rose 1996+
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to have low GS given the high extraction levels of a single resource, coupled with
lower than normal investment in human capital, dimensions of the familiar “resource
curse” hypothesis highlighted in the literature+68 The resource curse is blamed on
economic, political, and social factors, all of which are possible avenues through
which sustainability may be hampered+69 We control for resource dependence in
two ways+ First, we test a discrete variable that takes the value of one if exports of
petroleum are greater than 50 percent of GDP+ This measure is obtained from an
independent source+70 Secondly, we employ continuous measures for fuels and ores
and mineral exports in total merchandise exports+71
Democracy, it is often argued, is good for environmental protection because it
empowers people and provides channels through which governments can be influ-
enced by civil society+72 Democracy also enhances international environmental coop-
eration+73 The rise of green movements, nongovernmental organizations, and other
activist movements within democracies is seen as proof of this+ Democracy also
relates to trade openness, with many arguing that democracy increases open-
ness+74 Moreover, democracy also affects the gross savings rate as politics drive
tax policies and affect the issue of corruption and rent-seeking behavior+ We use
the standard Polity IV ~version 2! data+75 We subtract autocratic values from the
democratic values and add 11 to create a scale from 1 to 21+We construct a dummy
variable for regime type by assigning the value 1 if democracy ranges from 16–21,
and 0 if the values are between 1 and 15 ~autocracy!+ This variable correlates per-
fectly with others who have used the Polity data in a similar manner+76
In addition, we include two further measures of governance as control vari-
ables+ One is the political constraints ~polcon! index developed by Henisz+77 He
has designed his index as an indicator of the ability of political institutions to
make credible commitments to an existing policy regime, which he argues is the
most relevant political variable of interest to investors+ Building on a simple spa-
tial model of political interaction, the index makes use of the structure of govern-
ment in a given country and the political views represented by the different levels
of government ~that is, the executive, the legislature!+ It measures the extent to
which political actors are constrained in their choice of future policies by the exis-
tence of other political actors who will have to consent+ Scores range from 0, which
indicates that the executive has total political discretion and could change existing
policy regimes at any point of time, to 1, which indicates that a change of existing
68+ See Atkinson and Hamilton 2003; and Hamilton 2001+
69+ See Auty 2001; Gylfason 2000; Ross 1999; and Sachs and Warner 2001+
70+ Easterly and Sewadeh 2001+
71+ These variables are obtained from World Bank 2002+
72+ See Dryzek 1997; Frankel 2003; and Midlarsky 2000+
73+ Neumayer 2002b+
74+ Milner 1999+
75+ Jaggers and Gurr 1995+
76+ Fearon and Laitin 2003+
77+ Henisz 2000+
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policy regimes is totally infeasible+ Of course, in practice agreement is always
feasible, so the maximum score is less than 1+ Not surprisingly, polcon is highly
correlated with democracy+ However, the results reported below hardly change if
either of the two variables is dropped from the model to address potential prob-
lems with multicollinearity+ The other governance measure captures the stability
of the political system by counting the percent of veto players dropping out from
government in any given year+ This variable is taken from the World Bank’s Data-
base of Political Institutions+78
Trade dependence, the savings rate, and environmental stress are affected by
demographic factors+79 Thus population size ~total population!, population density
~people per square kilometer!, and the share of urban population in total popula-
tion are included in the models+ Urbanization has important implications for lev-
els of pollution and investment in manufactured capital because it is argued that
consumption rises with rising urbanization+80 These variables are all logged to min-
imize the effect of extreme values+
Finally, we enter control variables for experience with armed conflict, which
presumably influences savings rates and the degree to which extractive activity,
corruption, and accumulation of manufactured capital proceeds+We compute a count
of peace years since 1946 employing the Uppsala-PRIO data on civil wars and
using the BTSCS program in Stata+81 A civil war is defined as an internal war
~with and without foreign intervention! with 1,000 battle deaths or more+ The inci-
dence of civil war is also added to the models to account for ongoing civil war, so
as to capture any immediate effects above those of accumulated years of peace+
Appendix 3 provides summary statistics of the variables together with a bivar-
iate correlation matrix+ A few correlations are above 0+4+ The urbanization rate
and the agricultural share are the variables with the greatest number of high cor-
relations+ They were also identified as potential problem variables by variance infla-
tion factor analysis+ However, dropping these two variables or any of the other
control variables with high correlations from the model hardly affects our results+
The analysis of time-series cross-sectional ~TSCS! data generally poses several
problems in the estimating process+ TSCS data have complicated temporal and
spatial structures that simple ordinary least squares ~OLS! cannot adequately account
for+ TSCS models often allow for temporally and serially correlated errors as well
78+ World Bank 2003b+
79+ See Alesina and Spolaore 1997; and Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2003+ Neo-Malthusian
views and antiglobalization views generally coincide on issues of sustainable development+ There is
lively debate in the literature between the neo-Malthusians and the cornucopians, or those who think
substitution of natural resources with human ingenuity is possible+ For the classic debate, see Myers
and Simon 1994+ Most texts on environmental security and economic sustainability sample this debate+
See Conca and Dabelko 1998+
80+ Shafik 1994+
81+ The civil war data ~Gleditsch et al+ 2002! can be downloaded from ^www+prio+no& and the
BTSCS program for generating the peace years and splines ~Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998! from
^www+vanderbilt+edu0;rtucker0programs0btscs0&+ Accessed 10 March 2005+
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as for heteroskedasticity+ The well-known Parks method based on generalized least
squares ~GLS!, which is close to the OLS method, is discredited for underestimat-
ing the true variability of the parameter estimates, which Beck and Katz report to
be as high as 200 percent+82 They propose panel-corrected standard errors ~PCSE!
together with OLS as an alternative procedure+ We follow this procedure, assum-
ing an autoregressive error process of order one ~AR1!+ Note that for this estima-
tor, we replace the year-specific dummies with a linear time trend because the
estimated variance-covariance matrix is not positive definite if year dummies are
used+83 For evaluating the robustness of the findings, we also estimate random
effects GLS and population averaged models, or the generalized estimation equa-
tion ~GEE! method, which is yet another testing procedure when the underlying
correlation structures in the data are unknown+84 In these estimations, an AR1 error
process is also assumed+ All estimations pass a Wald- or F-test at conventional
significance levels so that to save space no test statistics are reported+All the inde-
pendent variables are lagged one year to mitigate simultaneity bias, although for
our main variables of interest at least it will be hard to maintain that increased GS
increases trade and FDI dependence, or economic freedom, not the other way
around, as the literature discussed above indicates+
Results
During the period of our study, countries below the median of trade openness have
an average GS rate of 4+11 percent with a standard deviation ~SD! of 8+56, com-
pared to the average for countries above the median of 7+79 percent with a SD of
15+05+ For our FDI measure, the respective figures are 6+09 ~SD of 8+97! for coun-
tries below the median and 5+82 ~SD of 15+04! for countries above the median+
Countries below the median of the index of economic freedom have an average
GS rate of 3+16 ~SD of 9+89! compared to 11+19 ~SD of 11+08! above the median+
Figure 1 plots the period mean value of the logged trade share against the GS rate,
distinguishing between the developed countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development ~OECD!, developing countries with below median
natural resource intensity, and developing countries with above median natural
resource intensity+ Figures 2 and 3 do the same for the logged FDI stock to GDP
and the measure of economic freedom, respectively+
The much larger SDs of the more trade and FDI open countries suggest signif-
icant differences among this group of countries, which is likely to be rooted in
variation in other explanatory variables and stresses the importance of controlling
for these differences in our estimations+ Indeed, of the ten countries with the lowest
82+ Beck and Katz 1995+
83+ Results are robust toward replacing the linear time trend with five-year period dummies+
84+ Zorn 2001+
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GS rate over the period ~Azerbaijan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kazakhstan,
Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia,Yemen, Zambia!, eight countries have
trade openness and all countries have FDI openness above the median+ While at
the same time, of the ten countries with the highest GS rate ~Belize, Botswana,
Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Namibia, Seychelles, Singapore, South Korea, Thai-
land!, there are also nine and seven countries with trade and FDI openness, respec-
tively, above the median+ Clearly, one obvious characteristic of the countries with
very low GS rates is that they are mostly natural resource–intensive economies
~this can also be clearly discerned from Figures 1 to 3!+ Our multivariate estima-
tions reported below indeed show that resource intensity is an important determi-
nant of GS+We also take this as further reason to test our hypothesis in a subsample
of resource-intensive economies+ A characteristic of the countries with high GS
rates is that some of them clearly have high per capita incomes+ This factor points
toward the need to control for per capita income to ensure that our measures of
trade and FDI openness ~as well as economic freedom! do not spuriously pick up
an effect that truly belongs to the level of economic development+ It also prompts
us to test our hypotheses in subsamples of developing and low-income countries+
Turning to our multivariate analysis, Table 1 presents the results of trade and
FDI’s effects on the GS rate using three estimation procedures, the random effects
GLS, the GEE, and the PCSE methods+ As seen there, in columns ~1! and ~2!,
both trade and FDI dependence are positively and statistically significantly asso-
FIGURE 1. Period mean values of logged trade openness (horizontal) and
genuine savings rates (vertical axis)
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ciated with the GS rate using the random effects GLS method if entered sepa-
rately into the estimations+ The statistical significance of the trade variable is
confirmed in column ~4! when GEE is used, but the FDI variable becomes mar-
ginally insignificant in column ~5!+85 Both variables are significant again in col-
umns ~7! and ~8! when the PCSE method is employed+ When both FDI and trade
are entered in the regression together—columns ~3!, ~6!, and ~9!—then both vari-
ables remain positive, with trade retaining its statistical significance, but FDI becom-
ing statistically insignificant+With a bivariate correlation of r 0+44, it seems that
trade openness masks the effects of FDI on the GS rate if entered together+
When entered into the regressions separately, then, in comparison, trade open-
ness is the substantively more important variable of the two+ A one SD increase in
trade openness raises the GS rate by up to 1+5 percentage points, compared to up
to 0+86 percentage points for a one SD increase in the FDI measure+ These values
do not seem high, but keep in mind that the average GS rate across the period is
only 6+95 percent+ Also, the SDs are relatively small for our measures of eco-
nomic openness as many countries are clustered around the mean value+ If we
85+ Note that the GEE estimator drops Lebanon from the regression as this country has only one
observation in the time period, which is not enough to estimate the necessary correlation statistic for
this estimator+
FIGURE 2. Period mean values of logged FDI stock (horizontal) and genuine
savings rates (vertical axis)
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look at the effect of moving from the least open to the most open regimes instead,
then this raises the GS rates by up to 11+15 and 7+9 points in the case of trade and
FDI openness, respectively+ Another way to demonstrate the effect of economic
openness is to look at predicted values from the estimations+ Based on the col-
umns ~7! and ~8!, the average predicted GS rates for the countries with trade and
FDI openness below the median are 5+10 and 5+61 percent, respectively, whereas
the relevant values for countries with openness above the median are 8+19 and
7+43 percent, respectively+ These predicted rates are close to the actual averages
from the bivariate analysis reported above, which suggests that the observed dif-
ferences between relatively closed and relatively open economies uphold after con-
trolling for several important determinants of GS+
Notice that all the three methods used for the analysis of the data produce
somewhat similar results with our control variables+ Per capita income is strongly
positively associated with GS across the testing procedures+ However, the effect
is nonlinear suggesting that per capita income raises GS with diminishing returns+
The economic growth rate is not statistically significant+ Given that higher income
levels are good for GS, growth’s long-term, accumulated effect should be posi-
tive, however+ A higher percentage of an economy devoted to agriculture is neg-
ative for accumulating GS in columns ~7! and ~8!+ This result provides some
limited support to those who argue that the modernization of economies pro-
motes sustainability+ Events of currency crises do not lower the GS rate+ Depen-
dence on oil extraction has a strong negative effect on the GS rate as others have
FIGURE 3. Period mean values of economic freedom (horizontal) and genuine
savings rates (vertical axis)
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also reported+86 This result is statistically highly significant and substantively very
large+ Being an oil export-dependent country lowers the GS rate by an average
of roughly 20 percentage points+
Democracy’s effect on GS is positive and statistically significant only in the last
two columns when the PCSE method is used+ Our results suggest that democracy’s
actual performance does not necessarily match the degree of emphasis on this vari-
able in the academic and popular discussions on sustainability+ However, its pos-
itive effect, even if only statistically significant in PCSE estimation, is encouraging
and warrants closer analysis+ Moreover, given our crude dichotomization of the
Polity measure, future research should focus on disaggregating types of democra-
cies, as differing democratic institutions produce varying policy outcomes+87 At
the same time, we find that neither constraints on policymakers nor governmental
stability affect the GS rate+
More densely populated societies are associated with higher GS rates, contrary
to the pervasive neo-Malthusian discussions on sustainable development+ In other
words, population pressure within a territorial unit does not inhibit GS, but it pro-
motes it, net of the other control variables in the model, such as income+ Popula-
tion size, on the other hand, is negative, but the results are far from statistical
significance+ Higher percentages of urban population, net of the influence of the
other control variables, seem to be detrimental to the GS rate+
Civil war experience lowers the GS rate, but a longer period of peace exerts a
positive and statistically significant effect only in columns ~7! to ~9!+ These results
are net of income+ Given war’s detrimental effects on income, the overall effect
on gains to GS from peace is bigger still+ This interesting subject too warrants
further reflection and more analysis given the recent theoretical arguments about
natural resource dependence and civil war+88
Are our results generated by the presence of developed countries in the sample?
To provide a fair test of the effect of globalization on sustainability, we need to
check whether our results uphold for the countries critics of globalization are most
concerned about+ In Table 2 we repeat estimations for subsamples of countries+ To
save space, we concentrate on results from PCSE estimations+ In columns ~1! and
~2!, we restrict the sample to developing countries, dropping Japan,Australia, New
Zealand, and Northern American and Western European countries+ In columns ~3!
and ~4!, we further restrict the sample to countries classified as falling into the
low-income category by the World Bank+ In columns ~5! and ~6!, we check whether
results uphold for those developing countries, which trade more than proportion-
ally with Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ~OECD! coun-
tries by restricting the sample to countries whose trade with OECD countries divided
by GDP is above the median value+ Next, we explore whether trade openness and
86+ Hamilton 2001+
87+ See de Soysa 2003; Lijphart 1994; and Powell 2000+
88+ Collier et al+ 2003+
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TABLE 1. Random effects GLS, GEE, and PCSE regression estimates of trade and FDI dependence on genuine savings rate
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
GLS GLS GLS GEE GEE GEE PCSE PCSE PCSE
trade/gdp ~ln! 2+416 2+122 2+630 2+288 2+292 1+902
~3+12!*** ~2+71!*** ~2+34!** ~2+00!** ~2+49!** ~2+06!**
fdi/gdp ~ln! 0+516 0+382 0+634 0+475 0+668 0+506
~1+80!* ~1+32! ~1+47! ~1+11! ~1+96!* ~1+44!
gni p.c. ~ln! 21+933 21+999 20+211 18+569 18+491 17+268 25+443 24+621 24+178
~3+51!*** ~3+49!*** ~3+20!*** ~2+33!** ~2+26!** ~2+14!** ~3+96!*** ~3+74!*** ~3+67!***
(gni p.c.)2 ~ln! 0+977 0+964 0+858 0+837 0+825 0+746 1+268 1+207 1+178
~2+64!*** ~2+58!*** ~2+30!** ~1+79!* ~1+73!* ~1+59! ~3+34!*** ~3+09!*** ~3+01!***
economic growth 0+009 0+011 0+008 0+008 0+007 0+006 0+009 0+008 0+007
~0+37! ~0+46! ~0+34! ~0+22! ~0+20! ~0+16! ~0+29! ~0+25! ~0+23!
agriculture/gdp 0+052 0+060 0+046 0+052 0+069 0+052 0+085 0+094 0+079
~1+11! ~1+29! ~0+98! ~0+96! ~1+27! ~0+94! ~1+70!* ~1+92!* ~1+57!
currency crisis 0+017 0+234 0+003 0+037 0+264 0+009 0+058 0+121 0+092
~0+04! ~0+59! ~0+01! ~0+09! ~0+64! ~0+02! ~0+12! ~0+24! ~0+18!
fuel exporter 18+230 17+853 18+037 19+852 19+666 19+801 19+211 19+034 19+130




democracy 1+034 1+035 1+103 1+193 0+990 1+137 1+235 1+071 1+203
~1+45! ~1+44! ~1+54! ~1+56! ~1+26! ~1+48! ~1+93!* ~1+68!* ~1+86!*
political constraints 1+203 1+189 1+057 0+864 1+023 0+910 0+240 0+377 0+215
~0+80! ~0+79! ~0+71! ~0+62! ~0+71! ~0+64! ~0+16! ~0+26! ~0+15!
government stability 0+344 0+387 0+358 0+265 0+323 0+289 0+341 0+379 0+352
~1+00! ~1+12! ~1+04! ~0+68! ~0+81! ~0+73! ~1+09! ~1+21! ~1+13!
population density ~ln! 1+078 1+215 1+052 1+250 1+458 1+246 1+194 1+388 1+210
~2+48!** ~2+77!*** ~2+39!** ~2+19!** ~2+55!** ~2+17!** ~3+33!*** ~4+07!*** ~3+30!***
population size ~ln! 0+116 0+332 0+064 0+095 0+355 0+080 0+153 0+209 0+142
~0+29! ~0+86! ~0+16! ~0+22! ~0+86! ~0+18! ~0+40! ~0+71! ~0+38!
population urban 8+490 9+095 9+007 7+114 7+522 7+588 8+186 8+537 8+584
~5+57!*** ~5+90!*** ~5+87!*** ~3+85!*** ~3+48!*** ~3+74!*** ~8+32!*** ~8+81!*** ~8+91!***
civil war 1+473 1+702 1+667 1+867 1+907 1+870 1+858 1+909 1+849
~2+01!** ~2+30!** ~2+26!** ~2+40!** ~2+34!** ~2+35!** ~2+55!** ~2+58!*** ~2+52!**
peace years 0+010 0+002 0+001 0+024 0+020 0+018 0+044 0+042 0+040
~0+40! ~0+07! ~0+04! ~0+83! ~0+69! ~0+60! ~2+37!** ~2+04!** ~1+94!*
Observations 2069 2050 2046 2068 2049 2045 2069 2050 2046
Countries 135 135 135 134 134 134 135 135 135
Note: Absolute z-scores in parentheses+ An AR1 correlation structure assumed in all regressions+ Robust standard errors computed with GEE estimations+ Constant and year dummies
included in all regressions except for PCSE tests, where years enter the equation in linear form ~coefficients not reported!+ All independent variables are lagged one year+ FDI 
foreign direct investment; GDP gross domestic product; GEE  generalized estimation equation; GLS  generalized least squares; GNI P+C+  gross national income per capita;
PCSE  panel-corrected standard errors+













TABLE 2. Effects of trade and FDI dependence on genuine savings rate in sub-samples of countries (PCSE estimates)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
trade/gdp ~ln! 2+547 2+266 3+838 1+785 1+490
~2+66!*** ~1+84!* ~2+03!** ~2+04!** ~1+28!
fdi/gdp ~ln! 0+798 0+747 1+175 0+767 0+788
~2+18!** ~1+66!* ~2+16!** ~1+93!* ~1+72!*
gni p.c. ~ln! 27+873 25+511 19+192 22+797 50+321 44+195 65+237 62+569 78+649 74+100
~3+21!*** ~2+82!*** ~0+78! ~0+90! ~2+93!*** ~2+64!*** ~5+28!*** ~5+02!*** ~5+44!*** ~4+89!***
(gni p.c.)2 ~ln! 1+425 1+260 1+976 2+276 2+847 2+436 3+744 3+562 4+639 4+344
~2+59!*** ~2+19!** ~1+11! ~1+25! ~2+70!*** ~2+34!** ~4+73!*** ~4+47!*** ~5+13!*** ~4+57!***
economic growth 0+010 0+011 0+014 0+013 0+049 0+037 0+034 0+039 0+067 0+072
~0+34! ~0+34! ~0+31! ~0+27! ~0+87! ~0+68! ~0+97! ~1+09! ~1+39! ~1+47!
agriculture/gdp 0+091 0+099 0+061 0+074 0+057 0+086 0+114 0+114 0+034 0+028
~1+80!* ~1+98!** ~1+26! ~1+57! ~0+57! ~1+01! ~1+93!* ~1+92!* ~0+46! ~0+35!
currency crisis 0+088 0+100 0+119 0+396 0+892 1+059 0+375 0+508 0+652 0+847
~0+17! ~0+19! ~0+15! ~0+48! ~0+90! ~1+06! ~0+66! ~0+89! ~0+81! ~1+06!
fuel exporter 19+291 19+179 20+941 20+772 16+616 17+766 16+871 16+975 14+687 14+691
~10+84!*** ~10+47!*** ~5+72!*** ~5+57!*** ~6+62!*** ~7+25!*** ~9+17!*** ~9+49!*** ~8+17!*** ~8+43!***
democracy 1+304 1+138 0+074 0+022 0+617 0+095 0+981 0+733 0+858 0+733
~1+98!** ~1+75!* ~0+07! ~0+02! ~0+50! ~0+08! ~1+29! ~0+98! ~0+83! ~0+70!
political constraints 0+059 0+326 4+003 4+311 3+271 2+508 2+784 2+668 3+042 2+970
~0+04! ~0+21! ~1+47! ~1+55! ~1+00! ~0+76! ~1+59! ~1+51! ~1+16! ~1+09!
government stability 0+364 0+419 0+703 0+758 0+639 0+682 0+429 0+477 0+323 0+337
~0+92! ~1+06! ~1+01! ~1+09! ~0+74! ~0+74! ~0+87! ~0+98! ~0+61! ~0+64!
population density ~ln! 1+225 1+425 0+045 0+193 2+293 2+433 0+393 0+482 0+211 0+151
~2+98!*** ~3+55!*** ~0+08! ~0+32! ~3+19!*** ~3+74!*** ~0+91! ~1+16! ~0+42! ~0+30!
population size ~ln! 0+226 0+139 0+769 0+445 0+192 0+485 0+764 0+527 1+022 0+802
~0+57! ~0+43! ~1+49! ~0+99! ~0+29! ~0+87! ~2+24!** ~2+00!** ~2+50!** ~2+65!***
population urban 8+241 8+623 9+325 10+193 8+131 7+618 11+668 11+738 9+478 9+618
~8+72!*** ~8+96!*** ~9+14!*** ~9+10!*** ~4+57!*** ~4+86!*** ~8+19!*** ~8+37!*** ~5+63!*** ~5+67!***
civil war 1+858 1+930 2+413 2+657 5+506 4+667 1+852 1+873 1+442 1+470
~2+53!** ~2+59!*** ~1+86!* ~2+02!** ~1+74!* ~1+44! ~2+35!** ~2+37!** ~1+58! ~1+58!
peace years 0+043 0+041 0+050 0+057 0+041 0+053 0+066 0+060 0+074 0+055
~2+12!** ~1+76!* ~1+37! ~1+49! ~1+17! ~1+44! ~2+57!** ~2+45!** ~2+02!** ~1+52!
Observations 1719 1700 751 746 607 606 1198 1191 776 771
Countries 114 114 50 50 70 70 85 85 67 66
Note: Absolute z-scores in parentheses+ An AR1 correlation structure assumed in all regressions+ Constant and linear time trend included ~coefficients not reported!+ All independent variables are lagged
one year+ FDI  foreign direct investment; GDP gross domestic product; GNI P+C+  gross national income per capita; PCSE  panel-corrected standard errors+




FDI raise GS also in developing countries that are particularly reliant on natural
resource extraction+ For this purpose, in columns ~6! and ~7!, we restrict the sam-
ple to countries whose rents from natural resource extraction relative to their gross
national income ~GNI! is in the upper three quartiles+ Last, columns ~8! and ~9!
further restrict the sample to developing countries with resource rents to GNI above
the median+ The most interesting feature in these estimations is that despite vari-
ances in sample size, FDI remains positive and significant in all estimations as
does trade, which is only insignificant in column ~9!+ Globalization remains a pro-
moter of sustainability even in groups of countries thought to be the most vulner-
able, perhaps with the exception of countries heavily dependent on natural resource
extraction+89
We have shown already that natural resource intensity has a substantively impor-
tant impact on the GS rate+ So far we have used a rather crude measure of resource
intensity, which had the advantage, however, of being available for a maximum
number of countries+ In Table 3 the dichotomous measure of oil export depen-
dence is substituted by two continuous measures of fuel exports and metals and
ores exports as a percentage of merchandise exports+ The substitution results in
the loss of ten countries from the sample, but the new resource export measures
are more comprehensive, containing more information than the simple dummy vari-
able+ Although the fuel export dependence variables are correlated at r  0+80
with each other, the fuel measures are only weakly correlated with exports of met-
als and ores+ As seen in columns ~1! and ~2!, the effects of trade and FDI on the
GS rate remain positive and statistically highly significant+ The results of the nat-
ural resource variables are both consistent with the findings of others, and the con-
trol variables remain nearly the same except that now, the results on democracy
are statistically far from significant+ Contrarily, the effect of accumulated years of
peace is now consistently statistically significant with the expected positive sign+
In Table 4 we report the results of running the models with the measure of eco-
nomic freedom+ We first include only economic freedom, then add trade and FDI
openness in separate estimations, finishing with a model that includes all three
variables; economic freedom is positively associated with the GS rate throughout+
A one SD increase in the index of economic freedom increases the GS rate by up
to 3+25 percentage points, a move from the minimum observed value to the max-
imum by up to 20+8 points+ The predicted average GS rate for the countries below
the median of the index of economic freedom is 2+83 percent, whereas it is 11+74
percent for the ones above+ Results for the rest of the control variables are rather
similar to those reported in Table 2, despite the fact that the number of countries
decreases by twenty-six+ This suggests again that the results are quite robust to
differences in sample size+ Trade openness is positive and significant, whereas FDI
openness is positive, but insignificant, whether added in isolation or in combina-
89+ The domestic political economy of education spending within resource-wealthy countries pos-
sibly influences this result; see Gylfason 2000+
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tion with economic freedom+ Restricting the sample to be the same, but including
just FDI openness, leads to a positive and highly significant coefficient of this
variable in column ~5!+ This suggests that the insignificance of the FDI measure is
not because of the reduction in sample size+ Instead, as before, the positive effect
TABLE 3. Effects of trade and FDI dependence on genuine savings rate
controlling for fuel exports and metals and ores exports (PCSE estimates)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
trade/gdp ~ln! 2+787 2+463
~3+05!*** ~2+61!***
fdi/gdp ~ln! 0+528 0+333
~1+72!* ~1+03!
gni p.c. ~ln! 24+141 23+443 23+679
~3+76!*** ~3+59!*** ~3+62!***
(gni p.c.)2 ~ln! 1+203 1+165 1+173
~3+26!*** ~3+11!*** ~3+13!***
economic growth 0+011 0+013 0+011
~0+35! ~0+40! ~0+37!
agriculture/gdp 0+066 0+089 0+066
~1+36! ~1+82!* ~1+34!
currency crisis 0+099 0+251 0+079
~0+20! ~0+50! ~0+16!
% metal & ore exports 0+077 0+067 0+074
~2+67!*** ~2+28!** ~2+55!**
% fuel exports 0+203 0+201 0+205
~9+46!*** ~8+50!*** ~8+70!***
democracy 0+226 0+084 0+217
~0+33! ~0+12! ~0+31!
political constraints 1+208 1+280 1+212
~0+83! ~0+87! ~0+83!
government stability 0+148 0+192 0+154
~0+46! ~0+60! ~0+48!
population density ~ln! 1+131 1+462 1+170
~3+14!*** ~4+20!*** ~3+13!***
population size ~ln! 0+626 0+179 0+641
~1+73!* ~0+63! ~1+75!*
population urban 7+206 7+002 7+114
~5+81!*** ~5+47!*** ~5+65!***
civil war 1+721 1+860 1+818
~2+14!** ~2+28!** ~2+24!**
peace years 0+058 0+057 0+052
~3+05!*** ~2+67!*** ~2+46!**
Observations 1945 1923 1923
Countries 125 125 125
Note: Absolute z-scores in parentheses+ An AR1 correlation structure assumed in all regressions+ Constant and linear
time trend included ~coefficients not reported!+ All independent variables are lagged one year+ FDI  foreign direct
investment; GDP gross domestic product; GNI P+C+  gross national income per capita; PCSE  panel-corrected
standard errors+
Significance as *** p , +01, ** p , +05, * p , +1+
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of FDI openness is masked by the inclusion of other aspects of economic open-
ness with which the FDI variable is correlated+
Are our results driven by country-specific fixed effects such as cultural differ-
ences, which we have not explicitly controlled for so far? Table 5 reports results
from a fixed-effects GLS estimator with an assumed AR1 error process+ The results
TABLE 4. Effects of economic freedom on genuine savings rate (PCSE estimates)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
economic freedom 2+654 2+444 2+468 2+344
~4+86!*** ~4+48!*** ~4+15!*** ~3+96!***
trade/gdp ~ln! 2+083 1+789
~2+46!** ~2+05!**
fdi/gdp ~ln! 0+566 0+428 0+964
~1+55! ~1+12! ~2+74!***
gni p.c. ~ln! 35+616 35+001 33+409 33+168 28+104
~5+18!*** ~4+98!*** ~4+76!*** ~4+65!*** ~3+99!***
(gni p.c.)2 ~ln! 1+958 1+899 1+806 1+777 1+394
~5+00!*** ~4+74!*** ~4+51!*** ~4+37!*** ~3+50!***
economic growth 0+041 0+043 0+043 0+045 0+041
~1+24! ~1+34! ~1+34! ~1+41! ~1+24!
agriculture/gdp 0+048 0+022 0+038 0+018 0+073
~0+92! ~0+41! ~0+71! ~0+32! ~1+36!
currency crisis 0+077 0+250 0+170 0+298 0+304
~0+15! ~0+49! ~0+34! ~0+59! ~0+59!
fuel exporter 16+981 16+987 16+976 16+968 18+084
~6+87!*** ~6+79!*** ~6+85!*** ~6+74!*** ~7+78!***
democracy 0+383 0+534 0+393 0+531 0+325
~0+59! ~0+82! ~0+59! ~0+80! ~0+48!
political constraints 1+635 1+612 1+497 1+474 1+120
~1+07! ~1+05! ~0+98! ~0+96! ~0+72!
government stability 0+580 0+549 0+587 0+560 0+612
~2+02!** ~1+93!* ~2+06!** ~1+98!** ~2+06!**
population density ~ln! 0+985 0+795 1+013 0+838 1+237
~4+01!*** ~3+02!*** ~3+96!*** ~3+04!*** ~4+55!***
population size ~ln! 0+210 0+237 0+128 0+233 0+091
~1+02! ~0+78! ~0+59! ~0+78! ~0+45!
population urban 6+608 6+851 6+770 6+936 7+470
~5+06!*** ~5+20!*** ~5+17!*** ~5+25!*** ~5+95!***
civil war 1+532 1+526 1+538 1+531 1+771
~2+18!** ~2+19!** ~2+20!** ~2+20!** ~2+45!**
peace years 0+033 0+029 0+024 0+021 0+030
~1+77!* ~1+60! ~1+27! ~1+13! ~1+59!
Observations 1813 1813 1800 1800 1800
Countries 109 109 109 109 109
Note: Absolute z-scores in parentheses+ An AR1 correlation structure assumed in all regressions+ Constant and linear
time trend included ~coefficients not reported!+ All independent variables are lagged one year+ FDI  foreign direct
investment; GDP gross domestic product; GNI P+C+  gross national income per capita; PCSE  panel-corrected
standard errors+
Significance as *** p , +01, ** p , +05, * p , +1+
Effects of Economic Openness on Sustainable Development 755
on trade, FDI, and economic freedom are not affected+ Note that in these fixed-
effects estimations we found no evidence for a nonlinear effect of income on the
GS rate, which is why only the linear income term is entered into the regressions+
The reason why some of the control variables cease to be statistically significant
in these estimations is because they vary little over time ~for example, population
density and the urbanization rate! and are thus estimated inefficiently by the fixed-
effects estimator, which draws on the over-time data variation in each country only+
As we mentioned, economic openness is often used as a proxy for “good” eco-
nomic policies+ In order to further check whether it was the degree of corruption
TABLE 5. Fixed effects estimation of genuine savings rate
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
trade/gdp ~ln! 2+772 2+405
~3+07!*** ~2+65!***




gni p.c. ~ln! 6+094 6+222 6+400 4+671
~3+03!*** ~3+15!*** ~3+24!*** ~2+29!**
economic growth 0+013 0+005 0+008 0+042
~0+49! ~0+18! ~0+32! ~1+65!*
agriculture/gdp 53+129 31+107 58+175 11+842
~2+30!** ~2+05!** ~2+43!** ~0+76!
currency crisis 0+031 0+175 0+076 0+058
~0+08! ~0+45! ~0+19! ~0+15!
fuel exporter 1+604 1+595 1+594 0+885
~2+09!** ~2+07!** ~2+07!** ~1+22!
democracy 0+722 0+597 0+590 0+547
~0+91! ~0+75! ~0+75! ~0+70!
political constraints 1+069 1+225 1+270 1+300
~0+66! ~0+76! ~0+79! ~0+82!
government stability 0+301 0+365 0+337 0+603
~0+87! ~1+06! ~0+98! ~1+79!*
population density ~ln! 0+374 0+518 0+562 5+027
~0+13! ~0+19! ~0+21! ~1+50!
population size ~ln! 3+236 3+536 3+849 0+605
~1+28! ~1+42! ~1+55! ~0+20!
population urban 5+685 8+587 8+490 9+365
~1+04! ~1+62! ~1+60! ~1+56!
civil war 0+020 0+023 0+023 0+019
~0+59! ~0+69! ~0+68! ~0+59!
peace years 0+010 0+034 0+000 0+012
~0+17! ~0+60! ~0+01! ~0+21!
Observations 1934 1915 1911 1704
Countries 134 134 134 109
Note: Absolute z-scores in parentheses+ An AR1 correlation structure assumed in all tests+ All independent variables
are lagged one year+ FDI  foreign direct investment; GDP  gross domestic product; GNI P+C+  gross national
income per capita+
Significance as *** p , +01, ** p , +05, * p , +1+
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rather than trade, FDI, or economic freedom that mattered, we tested the models
using International Country Risk Guide ~ICRG! data on “corruption,” which is
another widely accepted measure of good governance+90 The results of the global-
ization variables were unchanged when corruption was included+ This variable
turned out to be positive but statistically not different from zero+ Including two
measurements—M2 ~broad money supply! divided by GDP, and the age depen-
dency ratio—had little effect on the positive and significant effects of the global-
ization variables+We did not include portfolio investments in the main estimations,
because we do not expect these rather volatile investment flows to have any sig-
nificant effect on the GS rate and also because its inclusion would limit sample
size+ Running portfolio investment alongside trade and FDI, however, yielded an
insignificant effect on this variable, while the results on the other two globaliza-
tion variables were upheld+
In summary, the results taken together seem remarkably robust to sample size,
specification, and testing procedure+ The globalization variables remained unchanged
despite several alternative specifications+ If the spread of globalization and eco-
nomic liberalism increase interconnectivity among states, then these trends increase
the chances that states would be less profligate+ Our results taken together support
those who argue that globalization potentially improves conditions for sustainabil-
ity+ If increasing globalization is good for current economic development, our analy-
ses do not suggest that it is to the detriment of future generations+ What seems to
be harmful for sustainability is autarchy+
So far we have addressed a form of sustainability, which presumes a high degree
of substitutability among various forms of capital in the spirit of weak sustainabil-
ity+ The concept of EF is a measure in the spirit of strong sustainability, which
rejects substitutability+ The objective of EF is to translate all the ecological impact
of human economic activity into the “area required to produce the resources con-
sumed and to assimilate the wastes generated + + + under the predominant manage-
ment and production practices in any given year+”91 Because the focus is on
consumption, the required land area is attributed to the consumer rather than the
producer because the consumer is deemed responsible for the environmental impact+
For example, resources extracted in a developing country, but exported to a devel-
oped country, count toward the ecological footprint of the developed country+ The
following impacts are included: ~1! crop growing for food, animal feed, fiber, oil,
and rubber; ~2! animal grazing for meat, hides, wool, and milk; ~3! harvesting of
timber for wood, fiber, and fuel; ~4! fishing in oceans and freshwater; ~5! infra-
structure for housing, transportation, industrial production, and hydroelectric power;
90+ See Ades and Di Tella 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton 1999; and Treisman 2000+
The ICRG data on corruption gauge the degree to which the rule of law prevails+ We average the
quarterly scores for each year between 1984 and 1999+ The data are available for 110 countries in our
sample and was obtained from the Political Risk Services ~PRS! group, which supplies the data com-
mercially for a fee+ See ^www+prs+com&+
91+ Wackernagel et al+ 2002, 9266+
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and ~6! burning of fossil fuel+ Because of data problems, fresh water withdrawal
is not included+ Of all the human impacts, accounting for fossil fuel use is the
most important one, responsible for slightly less than half of the global EF in
1999+ This so-called energy footprint is the one that has grown fastest over the
past decades and in which the disparity between the developed and developing
countries is largest+
There are many problems with using EF as a measure of ecological sustainabil-
ity and with estimating how it is affected by globalization+ Conceptually, one can
argue that EF adds up “apples and oranges” in adding such diverse items as actual
land use for agricultural products and purely hypothetical land use for the absorp-
tion of carbon dioxide emissions+ The energy component is also the most contro-
versial part of EF+ It is calculated as the forest land area required to hypothetically
sequester enough carbon from the atmosphere to avoid any increase in the atmo-
spheric concentration of carbon from fossil fuel use+ There are many more possi-
bilities to sequester carbon from the atmosphere or to prevent carbon emissions
than land-intensive forestry, however+ Fossil fuel could be replaced with renew-
able energy, particularly wind and solar energy+92 The Danish Environmental Assess-
ment Institute has calculated that the energy footprint becomes negligible with
little impact on the overall EF if, hypothetically, 50 percent of world energy demand
were satisfied with renewable energy, which the institute claims to be technically
possible, and for the remaining energy demand, low carbon fuels such as natural
gas are used+93 From the practical side, a major drawback of the variable is that
EF have only been calculated for a global sample for three years, namely 1996,
1999, and 2000+94
These problems notwithstanding, Table 6 reports results for EF as the depen-
dent variable ~Appendix 2 lists each country’s ecological footprint and its change,
both averaged over the entire period of study!+ We use the GLS estimator with
random effects as the PCSE estimator is not the most suitable for short time peri-
ods+ The stability of the political system variable from the World Bank database
was not lagged in these estimations, which would not have allowed us to use the
EF value for the year 2000+ Neither trade, FDI, nor economic freedom are statis-
tically significant+ This remains true also in case the dependent variable is inter-
polated to gain more observations ~not shown!+ Apart from income, population
size, and population density, no other variables are significant+ Indeed, a model
with only per capita income and its squared term explains 80 percent of the vari-
ation in the data! This leaves little explanatory power for any of the other vari-
ables+ Higher per capita income first lowers the EF at low levels of income up to
an estimated threshold of around $1,000, after which higher income is associated
with higher EF+ It is apparent that the way the EF is constructed, high-income
92+ Neumayer 2003+
93+ Jørgensen et al+ 2002+
94+ World Wildlife Fund 2002, 2004+
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countries have high EF and poor countries have low EF, and there is little else that
matters+ Any policy recommendation from such a result would inescapably mean
“increase poverty,” an untenable position no matter which part of this divided planet
one lives in+ Interestingly, we find no support for neo-Malthusian population con-
cerns because countries with bigger populations and higher population density have
lower rather than higher ecological footprints+
TABLE 6. Estimation with ecological footprints as dependent variable
(random effects GLS)







gni p.c. ~ln! 6+589 6+490 6+744
~6+28!*** ~6+19!*** ~5+52!***
(gni p.c.)2 ~ln! 0+484 0+475 0+489
~7+87!*** ~7+72!*** ~6+86!***
economic growth 0+011 0+009 0+011
~1+36! ~1+10! ~1+24!
agriculture/gdp 0+000 0+004 0+001
~0+01! ~0+49! ~0+10!
currency crisis 0+035 0+055 0+095
~0+24! ~0+39! ~0+54!
fuel exporter 0+276 0+273 0+242
~0+96! ~0+95! ~0+66!
democracy 0+154 0+147 0+090
~0+95! ~0+92! ~0+49!
political constraints 0+125 0+159 0+188
~0+37! ~0+47! ~0+46!
government stability 0+011 0+020 0+017
~0+10! ~0+18! ~0+15!
population density ~ln! 0+231 0+235 0+238
~4+02!*** ~4+10!*** ~3+54!***
population size ~ln! 0+099 0+120 0+116
~1+67!* ~2+31!** ~1+95!*
population urban 0+207 0+206 0+227
~0+97! ~0+96! ~0+88!
civil war 0+129 0+111 0+156
~0+82! ~0+72! ~0+93!
peace years 0+001 0+001 0+001
~0+30! ~0+22! ~0+19!
Observations 296 300 255
Countries 115 115 95
Note: Absolute z-scores in parentheses+ An AR1 correlation structure assumed in all tests+ All independent variables
are lagged one year+ FDI  foreign direct investment; GDP  gross domestic product; GLS  generalized least
squares; GNI P+C+  gross national income per capita+
Significance as *** p , +01, ** p , +05, * p , +1+
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Conclusion
As one eminent scholar has put it, “reason and analysis require that we abandon
the conviction that globalization lacks a human face, an assertion that is tanta-
mount to a false alarm, and embrace the view that it has one+”95 Our estimations
support this view+ We examined the effects of trade, FDI, and economic freedom
on the World Bank’s GS rate, one composite measure of ~weak! sustainability+
The logic of the measure is that sustainable development requires keeping net sav-
ings of all forms of capital that we value at least above zero, thus capturing the
trade-offs inherent in the accumulation of some forms of capital at the expense of
others+ Because even building a school requires the trade-off of land, trees, other
resources, analyses of sustainable development have often failed to capture such
dimensions in their operationalization+ Thus the question becomes under what con-
ditions countries transform natural resources, including clean air, into income sus-
tainably+ Answering this question, our study gauged the effects of trade and FDI
dependence and degree of economic freedom on the GS rate over a period of twenty
years+ Our results are easily summarized+
Trade, FDI dependence, and economic freedom increase GS+ This runs counter
to what some dependency and world system theorists have argued in terms of a
capitalist world system damaging the well-being of future generations+ This study
finds no such effect of globalization+ Countries that are more closely integrated
into world markets and that allow a greater degree of economic freedom protect
their future well-being better than isolated countries that tightly restrict the free-
dom of economic activity+Allegations that globalization induces countries to max-
imize short-term benefits at the expense of mortgaging the future are therefore
without foundation+
A few country cases illustrate our main results+ Comparing the world situation
in the first half of the 1980s to that of the second half of the 1990s, many coun-
tries opened their economies and increased their GS rate substantially+ For exam-
ple, Chile and Ghana increased their share of trade to GDP by 14 and 64 percentage
points, their FDI stock relative to GDP by 30 and 8 percentage points, and their
Index of Economic Freedom by 2+4 and 2+8 points, respectively, while at the same
time increasing their GS rate by 22 and 9 percentage points, respectively+ Of course,
not all countries opened up trade and FDI and allowed more economic freedom
all at the same rate+ China is a good example+ It increased its trade share by 25
percentage points and its FDI stock relative to GDP by 21 percentage points, but
its increase in economic freedom of merely 0+8 points is less impressive+ In the
same time span, the country managed to increase its GS rate by 24 percentage
points+ Inevitably, there are also some failures, representing exceptions to the gen-
eral trend+ For example, Nicaragua and the Democratic Republic of Congo were
much more open in the late 1990s than in the early 1980s+ They increased their
95+ Bhagwati 2004, 265 ~italics in original!+
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trade share by 55 and 20 percentage points, their FDI share by 26 and 4 percent-
age points, and their index of economic freedom by 2 and 0+6 points, respectively+
Yet, their GS rate dropped by 5 and 7 percentage points, respectively+ In future
research, we would like to explore the reasons why some liberalizing countries
fail to achieve increases in GS+
Admittedly, our results only hold for weak sustainability+ However, such sus-
tainability is a prerequisite for achieving stronger forms of sustainability+ Also,
while we have not been able to demonstrate a positive effect of globalization on
strong sustainability, of which ecological footprints represent a crude and con-
tested measure, we have also not found any negative effect+ Clearly more research
needs to be done on the determinants of the GS rate beyond globalization con-
cerns, so that econometric models might be refined over time+When stronger find-
ings from other variables can be incorporated, we will be able to test further the
potential spuriousness of the association between trade, FDI, economic freedom,
and sustainability reported here+
This caveat notwithstanding, our results taken together suggest that economic
globalization leads to better management of the wealth of nations, a good pros-
pect for the present generation and for those to whom we bequeath the planet+ On
the other hand, resource-wealthy countries seem to waste resources, given that
they fail to translate extraction of nature’s wealth into sustainability via adequate
investment in manufactured and human capital, presumably because of the well-
documented feature of both economic and political “Dutch disease” that often result
in distorted markets, corruption, mal-governance, and social breakdown+
Many developing countries have embarked on a policy reform toward eco-
nomic openness in the last two decades or so+96 Whether this change is prompted
by the spectacular failure of inward-looking and import-substituting economic pol-
icies from previous decades97 is a consequence of the process of democratiza-
tion98 or has other reasons altogether need not concern us here+ What is important
is that, built on our estimations, the gradual adoption of open economic policies
even in resource-wealthy regions, such as Africa, is good news for weak
sustainability+
Appendix 1. Definitions of Components of the
Adjusted Net Savings (Genuine Savings)
• Gross national savings are equal to gross domestic investment minus net
foreign borrowing plus net official transfers+
96+ Simmons and Elkins 2004+
97+ Rodrik 1994+
98+ Milner and Kubota 2005+
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• Net national savings are equal to gross national savings less the value of
consumption of manufactured capital+
• Adjusted net savings, or genuine savings, are equal to net national savings
plus current education expenditures and minus energy depletion, mineral
depletion, net forest depletion, and carbon dioxide damage+
• Carbon dioxide damage is estimated as $20 per ton of carbon ~the unit
damage in 1995 U+S+ dollars! times the number of tons of carbon emitted+
• Current education expenditure refers to the current operating expenditures
in education, including wages and salaries and excluding capital invest-
ments in buildings and equipment+
• Energy depletion is equal to the product of unit resource rents and the phys-
ical quantities of energy extracted+ It covers crude oil, natural gas, and coal+
• Mineral depletion is equal to the product of unit resource rents and the
physical quantities of minerals extracted+ It refers to bauxite, copper, iron,
lead, nickel, phosphate, tin, zinc, gold, and silver+
• Net forest depletion is calculated as the product of unit resource rents and
the excess of roundwood harvest over natural growth+
Appendix 2. Genuine savings rates, ecological
footprints and their changes (mean period values)
Country GS GS change EF EF change
Albania 0+12 3+25 1+12 0+29
Algeria 2+47 1+29 1+71 0+12
Angola 8+96 4+47 0+89 0+11
Antigua and Barbuda 12+31 0+66
Argentina 4+21 0+28 3+24 0+15
Armenia 9+30 0+90 0+84 0+13
Australia 4+91 0+04 7+75 0+49
Austria 13+78 0+12 4+80 0+14





Belarus 15+94 0+21 3+43 0+10
Belgium 12+03 0+06 6+07 1+61
Belize 21+75 0+33
Benin 1+09 0+07 1+05 0+23
Bhutan 17+84 0+64
Bolivia 2+53 0+66 1+24 0+71
Bosnia and Herzegovina 1+20 0+44
Botswana 27+96 0+80 2+06 1+22
Brazil 10+27 0+21 2+41 0+01
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Country GS GS change EF EF change
Bulgaria 9+09 1+52 2+48 0+29
Burkina Faso 14+79 0+40 1+18 0+01
Burundi 5+36 1+04 0+55 0+15
Cambodia 9+30 0+19 0+86 0+20
Cameroon 1+81 0+60 1+20 0+13
Canada 8+14 0+46 8+40 0+28
Cape Verde 16+42 2+34
Central African Republic 3+10 0+33 1+41 0+23
Chad 2+23 0+13 1+12 0+29
Chile 0+32 0+63 3+37 0+07
China 18+40 1+61 1+51 0+18
Colombia 4+66 0+48 1+47 0+17
Comoros 11+58 0+06
Congo, Democratic Rep. 7+87 0+55 0+69 0+18
Congo, Rep. 15+81 2+44 0+94 0+12
Costa Rica 16+66 0+09 1+99 0+04




Czech Republic 13+83 1+04 4+61 0+58
Denmark 11+19 0+66 6+36 1+26
Dominica 14+67 0+91
Dominican Republic 10+89 0+38 1+50 0+16
Ecuador 8+64 0+03 1+69 0+23
Egypt 4+59 1+25 1+40 0+33
El Salvador 1+39 0+53
Eritrea 0+79 0+02
Estonia 10+74 1+55 5+27 0+43
Ethiopia 1+42 0+51 0+75 0+11
Fiji 11+09 0+73
Finland 11+54 0+14 7+81 1+42
France 12+44 0+00 5+50 0+48
Gabon 3+36 1+40 2+30 0+25
Gambia 12+29 0+53 0+97 0+01
Georgia 8+17 2+48 0+87 0+06
Germany 10+76 0+24 4+58 0+45
Ghana 4+85 0+31 1+13 0+16
Greece 14+85 0+47 5+00 0+31
Grenada 16+77 0+36
Guatemala 1+27 0+20 1+37 0+12
Guinea 1+40 1+14 1+21 0+01
Guinea-Bissau 2+29 1+72 0+84 0+35
Guyana 10+41 1+57
Haiti 3+71 0+18 0+75 0+20
Honduras 15+09 1+05 1+52 0+20
Hong Kong, China 23+01 0+17
Hungary 14+21 0+14 3+21 0+18
Iceland 8+43 0+21
India 9+43 0+24 0+79 0+01
Indonesia 10+13 0+21 1+11 0+15
Iran, Islamic Rep. 4+85 0+19 1+98 0+13
Ireland 16+77 0+58 5+38 0+36
~continued !
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Appendix 2 (Continued)
Country GS GS change EF EF change
Israel 6+57 0+07 4+48 0+47
Italy 11+60 0+21 3+61 0+58
Jamaica 9+05 0+94 2+14 0+08
Japan 20+43 0+49 4+45 0+86
Jordan 18+74 0+64 1+63 0+16
Kazakhstan 17+92 1+82 3+69 0+17
Kenya 13+39 0+12 1+12 0+01
Korea, Dem. Rep. 3+56 1+03
Korea, Rep. 24+47 0+23 3+03 0+88
Kuwait 5+73 0+38 8+38 0+26
Kyrgyz Republic 1+18 1+00 1+16 0+04
Lao PDR 0+95 1+45 0+87 0+27
Latvia 18+51 5+27 3+68 0+97
Lebanon 10+19 0+61 2+51 0+24
Liberia 20+97 0+41 0+97 0+06
Libya 19+95 0+93 3+34 0+07
Lithuania 9+01 0+15 3+61 0+80
Luxembourg 23+84 0+08
Macedonia, FYR 2+96 0+57
Madagascar 0+23 0+23 0+93 0+09
Malawi 2+23 0+58 0+79 0+23
Malaysia 14+18 0+91 3+35 0+17
Maldives 8+95 4+43
Mali 8+10 0+07 1+17 0+02
Malta 23+47 0+89
Mauritania 9+23 1+51 1+64 1+03
Mauritius 17+68 0+40 2+14 1+75
Mexico 3+05 0+27 2+51 0+07
Moldova 9+79 1+02 1+35 0+25
Mongolia 3+65 3+10
Morocco 15+69 0+28 1+09 0+18
Mozambique 2+90 0+76 0+61 0+09
Myanmar 0+72 0+06
Namibia 22+93 0+73 1+77 1+05
Nepal 8+09 0+73 0+75 0+26
Netherlands 14+78 0+29 4+68 1+00
New Zealand 12+99 0+09 8+30 0+55
Nicaragua 6+50 0+57 1+59 0+04
Niger 1+12 0+82
Nigeria 30+44 0+59 1+31 0+23
Norway 12+30 0+53 8+06 0+25
Oman 44+97 0+63
Pakistan 5+23 0+08 0+66 0+03
Panama 18+60 0+06 1+94 0+17
Papua New Guinea 1+37 0+17
Paraguay 7+85 0+33 2+47 0+22
Peru 5+30 0+06 1+28 0+11
Philippines 12+08 0+37 1+20 0+06
Poland 12+05 0+84 3+67 0+30
Portugal 14+03 0+54 4+75 0+87
Romania 10+45 1+78 2+66 0+06
Russian Federation 2+12 2+86 4+45 0+21
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Country GS GS change EF EF change
Rwanda 6+94 0+05 1+00 0+28
Saudi Arabia 29+65 0+71 4+55 0+02
Senegal 0+31 0+82 1+25 0+08
Seychelles 26+02 1+39
Sierra Leone 9+86 0+67 0+77 0+34
Singapore 33+56 0+82
Slovak Republic 19+02 0+52 3+44 0+17
Slovenia 3+70 0+06
Solomon Islands 12+64 0+01
Somalia 4+24 2+83
South Africa 0+23 0+16 3+78 0+50
Spain 12+28 0+16 4+69 0+24
Sri Lanka 16+20 0+38 0+96 0+12
St. Kitts and Nevis 16+54 0+53
St. Lucia 11+01 0+43
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 11+89 0+11
Sudan 3+88 1+67 1+14 0+14
Suriname 2+99 1+65
Swaziland 14+81 0+14
Sweden 11+24 0+06 7+07 1+22
Switzerland 17+11 0+34 4+56 1+14
Syrian Arab Republic 13+14 1+51 1+73 0+12
Tajikistan 15+28 4+49 0+69 0+01
Tanzania 5+19 0+17 1+03 0+14
Thailand 21+07 0+02 1+67 0+12
Togo 10+67 0+75
Trinidad and Tobago 12+15 1+00 3+03 1+57
Tunisia 11+90 0+65 1+61 0+18
Turkey 16+84 0+24 2+16 0+22
Turkmenistan 2+89 0+58
Uganda 4+42 0+37 1+15 0+23
Ukraine 3+50 0+16
United Arab Emirates 10+32 1+16
United Kingdom 6+45 0+09 5+18 0+63
United States 7+25 0+22 9+63 0+13
Uruguay 6+18 0+13 3+46 0+47
Uzbekistan 9+45 3+32
Vanuatu 23+98 0+54
Venezuela 7+99 0+79 2+47 0+08
Vietnam 8+97 1+02 0+76 0+00
Yemen, Rep. 15+16 1+12
Zambia 15+82 0+95 1+26 0+24
Zimbabwe 10+96 0+55 1+26 0+27
Note: GS  genuine savings; EF ecological footprint+
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genuine savings rate 2069 6+95 12+29 61+42 50+44
trade/gdp ~ln! 2069 4+09 0+56 1+84 6+08
fdi/gdp ~ln! 2046 2+12 1+30 6+18 5+66
economic freedom 1813 5+48 1+22 1 8+80
gni p.c. ~ln! 2069 8+07 1+11 5+74 10+26
economic growth 2069 1+21 4+97 39+73 30+83
agriculture/gdp 2069 19+32 14+74 0+15 61+54
currency crisis 2069 0+07 0+26 0 1
fuel exporter 2069 0+08 0+27 0 1
% fuel exports 1943 15+52 26+47 0 100
% metal & ore exports 2015 8+68 16+88 0+00 96+38
democracy 2069 0+47 0+50 0 1
political constraints 2069 0+22 0+22 0 0+71
government stability 2069 0+12 0+28 0 1
population density ~ln! 2069 3+87 1+47 0+41 8+78
population size ~ln! 2069 15+98 1+67 11+99 20+95
population urban ~ln! 2069 3+75 0+63 1+39 4+61
civil war 2069 0+07 0+25 0 1




I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII
I: trade/gdp ~ln! 1+00
II: fdi/gdp ~ln! 0+44
III: economic freedom 0+36 0+33
IV: gni p.c. ~ln! 0+26 0+20 0+67
V: economic growth 0+11 0+07 0+22 0+17
VI: agriculture/gdp 0+35 0+28 0+56 0+83 0+12
VII: currency crisis 0+01 0+01 0+20 0+15 0+18 0+12
VIII: democracy 0+01 0+09 0+37 0+50 0+11 0+38 0+08
IX: political constraints 0+05 0+10 0+45 0+57 0+17 0+44 0+09 0+77
X: government stability 0+07 0+03 0+02 0+08 0+00 0+03 0+05 0+21 0+16
XI: population density ~ln! 0+24 0+03 0+23 0+16 0+17 0+12 0+05 0+07 0+09 0+01
XII: population size ~ln! 0+59 0+23 0+02 0+07 0+08 0+08 0+01 0+05 0+05 0+03 0+10
XIII: population urban ~ln! 0+28 0+26 0+43 0+78 0+05 0+80 0+07 0+37 0+40 0+03 0+03 0+10
XIV: fuel exporter 0+08 0+07 0+15 0+05 0+10 0+13 0+04 0+11 0+14 0+06 0+10 0+11 0+13
XV: % fuel exports 0+06 0+04 0+14 0+04 0+08 0+16 0+02 0+21 0+24 0+08 0+15 0+01 0+18 0+80
XVI: % metal & ore exports 0+02 0+06 0+21 0+21 0+12 0+13 0+10 0+18 0+17 0+05 0+31 0+05 0+06 0+09 0+13
XVII: civil war 0+17 0+10 0+17 0+06 0+06 0+08 0+05 0+04 0+04 0+05 0+02 0+15 0+11 0+05 0+05 0+00
XVIII: peace years 0+22 0+12 0+37 0+41 0+07 0+32 0+06 0+31 0+27 0+04 0+05 0+18 0+32 0+06 0+08 0+10 0+32
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